Download Citation on ResearchGate | Content and Self-Knowledge | La these Pastist externalists (e.g., Boghossian ; Burge ) maintain that the past. Volume 17, Issue 1, Spring Philosophy of Mind. Paul A. Boghossian. Pages DOI: /philtopics Content and Self-Knowledge. Content and Self-Knowledge. Paul A. Boghossian University of Michigan. INTRODUCTION I. This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis.

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Externalism and Self-Knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Many works cited and further readings are found in the anthologies above: This entry has no external links. TW If a subject S is warranted in believing p and is warranted in believing that p entails contnet and S further recognizes that q follows deductively from these beliefs —then S acquires, potentially for the first time, a warrant in believing q.

Yet Brownch. On this approach, the slow switch argument assumes that W does not express knowledge, since the subject S fails to track the truth in the following sense:. If EXT is true, then in a slow switch Oscar cannot distinguish from the armchair a water content from a twin content. As Burgep. This is because 3 is empirical and it is conceded that 2 presupposes 3 cf.

But since the latter is not knowable from the armchair, then it seems neither is the former LevineEllis Yet incompatibilists reply that ironically these very reflections reveal apriori something that should not be apriori BrownBoghossian So he lacks knowledge of its content since knowledge requires truth.

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Sarah Sawyer – – Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 4 4: Jacob once expressed this well as follows: Still, why does this reveal a problem with our self-knowledge? Yet see the entry on externalism about mental content. Oscar is thinking that water is wet.

Fiction and ReferenceLanham, MD: Science Logic and Mathematics. For the thought experiments alone do not assume that water is necessary for water thoughts Brueckner For instance, well-known Quinean arguments exist against apriori knowledge, though this is not the place to discuss these.

Self-Knowledge is Empirical 2. But memory still preserves knowledge of his thought at t 1 —meaning that c is false.

Content and Self-Knowledge in Philosophy of Mind

Further, some writers have worried that if one can know what one thinks, then one can know that one thinks. But the existence of the thought must be acknowledged before one can concede a warrant to it. The view has garnered attention since it denies the traditional assumption, associated with Descartes, that thought content is fixed independently of the external world.

Even if Oscar is socially isolated and lives in a waterless environment, he can conceivably arrive at the concept by hypothesizing the H 2 O molecule Burge Nevertheless, self-knodledge skeptic could not justifiably claim that I – III figure into a sound argument Ebbs On the one hand, few if any features of the special epistemic authority granted by both the traditional empiricist and the traditional rationalist pictures of introspective self-knowledge have survived recent philosophical scrutiny.

Still, boghosssian may remain intuitively compelling that a Twin Earth boghossina experiment, if cogent, would show 1 apriori—even if E is just the condition where water exists.

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Externalism and Self-Knowledge

Anthony Anderson and J. The externalist view of memory can come as a shock; however, it might enjoy some intuitive support Tye For the constancy of the descriptors guarantees that the concept has the same content in every possible world, whether or not it contains unicorns Segal ; see also Besson Let us now focus our attention on the second version of the slow switch argument, a.

Indeed it seems Oscar cannot detect the switch just from the armchair. Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. For if we consider a counterfactual where I have twin water thoughts in lieu of water thoughts, I cannot believe I have water thoughts. It still suggests, however, that EXT precludes SK when certain skeptical hypotheses are entertained—contrary to, e. In more detail, if Oscar is agnostic about chemistry and knows that apriori about himself, he can use the reflections above to know apriori that his water thoughts metaphysically require the existence of water or a community.

Ebbs,Debating Self-KnowledgeCambridge: However, if the advocate grants an apriori warrant to 3this may succumb already to the reductio Brown ;SawyerBrueckner Alison Gopnik – – Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 1: Essays on Tyler BurgeStanford: